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Note
Challenging Peremptories: Suggested Reforms to
the Jury Selection Process Using Minnesota as a
Case Study
Maisa Jean Frank*
The right to have a case decided by a fair and impartial
group of one's peers receives great reverence in the American
judicial system.' When a criminal case goes to trial, one of the
first steps of the judicial process is selection of the jury.2 The
makeup of the jury can have a large effect (or at least a large
perceived effect) on the verdict because of the decisional power
juries enjoy.3 Thus, attorneys have an incentive to manipulate
the jury to include members who will likely return a favorable
verdict for their client.4 In an adversarial system, when both
sides engage in this process, they theoretically produce a bal-
anced jury.5
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005,
Carleton College. Thank you to Justice Paul Anderson for helpful comments
on an earlier version and the Note & Comment Department Editors for their
feedback. Copyright Q 2010 by Maisa Jean Frank.
1. See, e.g., Eva Kerr, Prejudice, Procedure, and a Proper Presumption:
Restoring the Remmer Presumption of Prejudice in Order to Protect Criminal
Defendants' Sixth Amendment Rights, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1451, 1453 (2008) (dis-
cussing the status of the jury as a "fundamental component of American juris-
prudence").
2. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
3. Cf. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (rationalizing that juries
serve as "instruments of public justice" when they are "truly representative of
the community").
4. See Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the
Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1029-30
(2007) (discussing the historical practice of jury manipulation to control the
outcomes of jury trials).
5. See 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2483, at 54 (3d ed. 2008) ('The use of peremptory chal-
lenges is of ancient origin and is given to aid each party's interest in a fair and im-
partial jury."); Christopher E. Smith, Imagery, Politics, and Jury Reform, 28
AKRON L. REV. 77, 92-93 (1994) (noting that supporters usually justify the per-
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During jury selection, the judge and attorneys representing
both sides question potential jurors to determine whether a ju-
ror has any particular characteristics or experiences that might
prevent him or her from rendering a verdict in a fair manner.6
To remove potentially biased jurors from the juror pool, attor-
neys may use either a challenge for cause or a peremptory chal-
lenge. 7 Challenges for cause involve elimination of jurors who
possess one or more characteristics that courts have predeter-
mined may make them unable to render unbiased decisions. 8
Examples of such characteristics include a relationship with
one of the parties or another jury experience involving the same
type of crime.9 A peremptory challenge, in contrast, allows an
attorney to remove a potential juror for no particular reason at
all.' 0
Since the peremptory challenge requires no justification for
its use, many critics fear attorneys use it for discriminatory
purposes." The Supreme Court first addressed the discrimina-
tory use of the peremptory challenge in Batson v. Kentucky,
where it held potential jurors could not be removed simply be-
cause of their race. 12 Recently, many state courts have consi-
dered expanding Batson's protection to the removal of jurors
based on other characteristics such as gender, 13 religious affili-
emptory challenge by claiming its use leads to "selection of a more impartial
jury").
6. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a); Christian Breheney et al., Gender Matters
in the Insanity Defense, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 93, 99 (2007) ("Jury selection
is premised on fairness, with the goal of identifying jurors who can apply the
law without undue bias.").
7. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b); Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy, A
Challenge for Cause Against Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Proceedings,
19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 507, 507-08 (1997) (discussing the differ-
ent purposes of each challenge).
8. See THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 38 (7th ed. 2007).
9. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 5.
10. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 189 (8th ed. 2004); see also Swain v. Al-
abama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) ("The essential nature of the peremptory
challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry
and without being subject to the court's control.").
11. See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge
Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 420 (1992) ("mhe peremptory
challenge ha[s] been, and will continue to be, used to discriminate in our cita-
dels of justice-our court rooms.").
12. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
13. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d 156, 157 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1992) (declining to extend Batson to gender-based strikes), rev'd sub nom.
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) ("[The Equal Protection Clause
prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender. . . .").
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ation,14 or sexual orientation. 15 States have also reconsidered
other elements surrounding the use of peremptory challenges,
such as how many each side may use and the propriety of using
the challenge at all.16 Minnesota recently considered both the
expansion of Batson to other suspect categories and a reformu-
lation of the method of using peremptory challenges.17 As such,
it provides a timely example of reform to the jury selection
process nationwide.
This Note discusses the future of peremptory challenges in
this country, using Minnesota, which recently considered re-
forms to its jury selection system, as a case study. Part I details
the underlying jurisprudence, statutes, and rules that govern
the use of peremptory challenges and describes the current pro-
cedure for impaneling a jury in Minnesota. It also discusses
proposed reforms to the system, such as a prohibition on using
peremptory challenges to discriminate against jurors with an
expanded set of characteristics, and a change in the number of
peremptories given to each party. Part II analyzes the efficacy
of the reform proposals. Lastly, Part III suggests a preferred
reform of the jury selection process. This Note demonstrates
that reform should include the elimination of the peremptory
challenge in most cases, since the for-cause challenge provides
an adequate avenue for party participation in jury selection.
Such reform is necessary to fulfill the Court's mandate in Bat-
son that the justice system proceed free from discrimination.
I. USE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN JURY
SELECTION AND PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE SYSTEM
Many attorneys believe they have an advantage when ar-
guing a case before a jury that can empathize with their
14. See, e.g., State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (ex-
tending Batson to encompass peremptory strikes based on religion); State v.
Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (declining to extend Batson to reli-
gious affiliation).
15. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 879 N.E.2d 87, 96 (Mass. 2008)
(commenting on, though not ruling on, whether a peremptory challenge based
on sexual orientation is unconstitutional).
16. See, e.g., PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING VOIR DIRE IN CALIFORNIA 2-3 (2004)
(discussing the efficacy of peremptory challenges and considering a reduction
in the number of peremptory strikes).
17. See Michelle Lore, Proposal Would Expand Restrictions On Use of Per-
emptories, MINN. LAW., Mar. 2, 2009, at 1.
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client.'8 Lawyers often favor jurors who share characteristics
such as race or gender with their client because this may in-
crease empathy, making jurors more likely to return a favora-
ble verdict.' 9 Since peremptory challenges allow attorneys to
eliminate potential jurors for no reason at all, they provide a
tool for attorneys to create a jury of a particular racial and
gender makeup. 20
Over the past half-century, with the spread of the civil
rights movement, courts came to view discriminatory use of
such challenges critically.21 Jurisprudence surrounding the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ex-
panded into many areas of the law including the use of peremp-
tory challenges in jury selection. 22 The landmark decision Bat-
son v. Kentucky held that the use of a peremptory challenge to
remove a potential juror due to his race violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.23 Batson signaled the
Supreme Court's desire to prevent discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge. 24
Since Batson, reform of the jury selection process continues
to be a preeminent issue nationwide, with many states enter-
18. See Brandon Righi, A Covert Expression?: Voir Dire and the Impartial
American Jury, 3 NEOAMERICANIST 1, 3 (2008), http://neoamericanist.org/
sites/default/files/pdfs/righi.pdf ("While it is debatable whether or not voir dire
is used to facilitate racial discrimination, its use to eliminate jurors who hold
certain ideological principles is undeniable.").
19. See Douglas 0. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV.
887, 897 (1996) ("Similarities between jurors and other trial participants in-
crease the likelihood of empathetic reactions that could determine trial out-
comes.").
20. But peremptory challenges are not without limitation. See, e.g., Illi-
nois v. Rivera, 852 N.E.2d 771, 791 (Ill. 1996) (holding that a trial court may
refuse a transparently discriminatory peremptory challenge).
21. See John J. Francis, Peremptory Challenges, Grutter, and Critical
Mass: A Means of Reclaiming the Promise of Batson, 29 VT. L. REV. 297, 312-
20 (2005) (discussing at length the expansion of Batson in response to increas-
ing protections under the Equal Protection Clause).
22. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
23. See id. at 89 ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race .... ).
24. See Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Mo-
tives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 317 (2007)
("Batson signaled that the traditionally unfettered common law/statutory right
to peremptory challenges is subordinate to equal protection's constitutional
command." (citation omitted)); John P. Marks, Note, Bader v. State: The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court Restricts the Role Religion May Play in Jury Selection,
55 ARK. L. REV. 613, 625-32 (2002) (recounting the subsequent expansion of
Batson protection to non-race-based discriminatory use).
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taining improvements to the process.25 Each state's courts
promulgate rules governing the specific jury selection process
in that state.26 Thus, examining the process in one state proves
helpful. Since Minnesota's bar association recently proposed re-
forms to the state's jury selection process, 27 it provides a nice
case study through which to analyze the merit of such reforms.
Jury selection in Minnesota is governed by United States and
Minnesota Supreme Court precedent, statutes, and rules of
procedure. This Part discusses each of these, offers a descrip-
tion of the jury impaneling process in Minnesota as an example
of state procedure, and then summarizes proposed reforms of
the system.
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Throughout the twentieth century, civil rights activists
worked to curb discriminatory thinking and enlarge equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. 28 Since discriminatory use of the peremp-
tory challenge often involved prejudice based on race or gender,
Supreme Court limitations on its use naturally followed limita-
tions on other types of discriminatory behavior. 29 However, the
Supreme Court has also expanded the discretion given to trial
judges once they use the proper method for identifying discrim-
ination in jury selection. This section details the case law giv-
ing rise to those principles.
1. Early Cases
As early as 1879, the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited ra-
cially motivated jury selection.30 In striking down a statute that
excluded black males from jury service in Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, the Court found that excluding black males from the de-
25. See, e.g., HANNAFORD-AGOR & WATERS, supra note 16, at 6-7 (discuss-
ing the reforms of the voir dire system in California).
26. See id. at 4.
27. See Lore, supra note 17, at 1.
28. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
153, 167 (1989).
29. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (analogizing dis-
crimination of a venireperson to the "invidious quality" of racial discrimination
in other contexts).
30. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) ("[T]he statute
of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors, as it does, against
negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal protection of
the laws .... ).
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fendant's jury deprived him of equal protection of the law in vi-
olation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 31 Congress reaffirmed
this principle when it outlawed disqualification for service on a
jury "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude."32 Additionally, the Court stated in Smith v. Texas that
states should design the jury selection process to create a jury
that represented the community. 33 Although these cases elimi-
nated the use of explicitly discriminatory statutes and practices
in jury selection processes, discriminatory use of the perempto-
ry challenge continued unopposed until the Court decided
Swain v. Alabama in 1965.34
In Swain, the Court recognized that counsel for both sides
often exercised peremptory challenges "upon the 'sudden im-
pressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive
upon the bare looks and gestures of another,"' and considered
factors "normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or
official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupa-
tion or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty."3 5 The
Court suggested that such a pattern of discrimination on the
basis of race might violate the Equal Protection Clause. 36 It
placed the burden on the defendant, however, to show that the
prosecutor systematically excluded otherwise qualified jurors of
a particular race over a period of time.37 Since the defendant
could not show intent by the prosecutor, but could only offer
evidence that no black person had sat on a jury in that particu-
lar county in roughly fifteen years, the Court found no constitu-
tional violation.38 Swain remained the governing precedent for
nearly twenty years.
31. Id.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2006).
33. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ("It is part of the estab-
lished tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the
jury be a body truly representative of the community.").
34. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
35. Id. at 220.
36. See id. at 223 (stating that an equal protection claim has particular
significance when a prosecutor in a certain county, "whatever the crime and
whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of
Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners
and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes
ever serve on petit juries").
37. See id. at 227.
38. See id. at 224 ("The difficulty with the record before us ... is that it
does not with any acceptable degree of clarity, show when, how often, and un-
der what circumstances the prosecutor alone has been responsible for striking
2080 [94:2075
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2. The Landmark Batson v. Kentucky
The Court reformulated Swain's holding that the burden of
proof lay entirely with the defendant in Batson v. Kentucky.39
In Batson, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to
remove all four of the black men on the jury panel, which later
convicted Batson, a black man. 40 The Court began by acknowl-
edging that Swain placed a "crippling burden" on the defendant
by requiring him to show a pattern of discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges over a number of cases. 41 Next, the
Court detailed its jurisprudence regarding Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act since Swain.42 These cases required the party alleg-
ing discrimination to bear the ultimate burden of showing the
other party's discriminatory purpose, but allowed the alleging
party to do so using the "totality of the relevant facts . .. in his
case," rather than requiring a showing that the offending party
had a pattern of discriminatory behavior. 43
By analogy to its Title VII cases, the Court adopted a
three-part burden-shifting test to determine whether the State
exercised a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner. 44
The first step requires the defendant to produce evidence suffi-
cient to make a prima facie showing of purposeful exclusion of
jurors of a particular race.45 Next, the State can rebut this
showing by articulating a race-neutral explanation for the ex-
clusion.46 Lastly, the trial court determines whether the defen-
dant established purposeful discrimination.47 This case ulti-
[black jury members for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the par-
ticular cases he was trying].").
39. 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986) (shifting the burden of proof to the state af-
ter the defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination against black
jurors); see also Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Pros-
pective Jurors with Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability-Based Strikes?,
57 ALB. L. REV. 289, 310 (1993).
40. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83.
41. Id. at 92-93.
42. See id. at 93-94.
43. Id. at 94-95.
44. See id. at 93-94; Oluseyi Olubadewo, Casebrief, Racial Profiling in
Jury Selection: The Third Circuit Revisits the Batson Inquiry in Riley v. Tay-
lor, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1195, 1196-97 (2002) (delineating the three-part Batson
test).
45. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
46. See id. at 94 (requiring the state to show that "permissible racially
neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic
result" (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972))).
47. See id.
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mately changed the nature of peremptory strikes, since requir-
ing the prosecutor to give a race-neutral explanation suggests
that strikes may no longer be used to eliminate jurors based on
"unaccountable prejudices."48
The Court also enunciated three purposes served by the
Batson test 4 9: first, vindication of the defendant's right to be
tried in a system free from racial discrimination;50 second, pro-
tection of the juror's right to participate in a system free from
racial discrimination;5 1 and lastly, cultivation of public confi-
dence in the fairness of the justice system.52 As discussed next,
these three principles continue to justify the expansions of the
Batson holding in the cases that followed.
3. Batson's Progeny Expanded its Protection
A number of post-Batson cases extended its holding to oth-
er situations. 53 In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the
Court held that Batson's prohibition of the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges also applied in civil cases. 54 The Court
in Powers v. Ohio ruled that a white defendant could bring a
Batson challenge when the State excluded black venireper-
sons.55 Furthermore, Georgia v. McCollum held that the State
48. Id. at 123 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)); see also id. at 89 (majority opinion) (requiring that
prosecutors' strikes both relate to the outcome of the case and refrain from
"challeng[ing] potential jurors solely on account of their race"); Michelle Ma-
hony, The Future Viability of Batson v. Kentucky and the Practical Implica-
tions of Purkett v. Elem, 16 REV. LITIG. 137, 147 (1997) (stating that Batson
reduced the opportunity for prosecutors to eliminate jurors on the basis of per-
ceived group bias).
49. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
50. Id. at 86.
51. Id. at 87.
52. See id. (opining that discriminatory practices undermine the public's
confidence in the fairness of the judicial system, stimulate racial prejudice,
and impede equal justice for people of color).
53. See Steven C. Serio, A Process Right Due? Examining Whether a Capi-
tal Defendant Has a Due Process Right to a Jury Selection Expert, 53 AM. U. L.
REV. 1143, 1163-64 (2004) (describing the extension of the Court's holding in
Batson).
54. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
55. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991). Even though the Court
found no violation of the defendant's equal protection rights, it ruled the de-
fendant had third-party standing to bring a claim on behalf of the excluded
jury person. See id. at 411. The Court found the exclusion of a juror because of
race "places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt." Id. The Court also
held that while a venireperson does not have a right to sit on a jury, he or she
2082 [94:2075
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could also bring a Batson challenge against defendants who
used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of
race. 56
In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court extended Batson protec-
tion to jurors excluded through peremptory challenges on the
basis of sex.57 After noting that sex-based classifications gener-
ally receive heightened scrutiny in equal protection claims,5 8
the Court acknowledged the comparable history of total exclu-
sion from jury service shared by women and racial minorities,
and held that the use of peremptory strikes to exclude women
from juries should be subject to the same Batson test as exclu-
sions on the basis of race.59 The Court went on to state,
"[p]arties may also exercise their peremptory challenges to re-
move from the venire any group or class of individuals normally
subject to 'rational basis' review," firmly anchoring the peremp-
tory challenge inquiry in equal protection jurisprudence. 6 0 The
Court relied on the suspect class methodology even in the ab-
sence of a fundamental right to exercise a peremptory chal-
lenge.61 It weighed the harm of using a sex-based peremptory
challenge against the legitimate state interest in securing a fair
and impartial jury.62 The Court's finding that the harm out-
weighed the State's interest continued to expand the protection
afforded potential jurors who were struck on discriminatory
grounds.
The Court addressed the second prong of the Batson test in
Purkett v. Elem, in which the Court restricted the availability
of the Batson challenge. 63 The Court held that the prosecutor
successfully rebutted a prima facie showing of discrimination
by explaining that he struck two black men from the jury be-
cause "[tlhose are the only two people on the jury . .. with the
does have a right not to be excluded from one on the basis of race. See id. at
409.
56. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (finding the state had
standing because the defendant's use of the peremptory challenge constituted
state action).
57. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
58. Id. at 135; see also, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To
withstand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.").
59. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136, 146.
60. Id. at 143.
61. Id. at 136-37.
62. Id.
63. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995).
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facial hair .... And I don't like the way they looked, with the
way the hair is cut."6 4 The Court held that at the second step of
the Batson inquiry, the trial court should only require the pros-
ecutor to give a facially valid explanation, which need not be
persuasive, or even plausible.65 Thus, after Purkett the Court
appeared to move in the direction of pre-Batson jurisprudence
by placing no appreciable burden of proof on the state.
Recently, however, the Court seemed to shift back towards
its previous precedent in Snyder v. Louisiana, in which it ex-
amined the third prong of the Batson test.6 6 In Snyder, the
Court enunciated a very deferential standard of review for the
trial court's findings regarding the credibility of the potential
juror. 67 Yet the Court went on to require a specific finding on
the record as to whether the defendant had shown purposeful
discrimination. 68 In the absence of a specific finding, the re-
viewing court had no way to determine whether the trial court
actually followed the third step of the Batson test.69 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court would not uphold a peremptory
strike without specific evidence that the trial court found the
potential juror not credible. 70
However, in its newest peremptory challenge case, Rivera
v. Illinois, the Court held that a trial court's erroneous denial of
a peremptory challenge need only receive harmless error re-
view instead of an automatic reversal.71 The Court held that
peremptory challenges are creatures of state law rather than
federal rights; hence, their denial does not violate due
process.72 As a result of this ruling, all such denials of peremp-
tory challenges will likely be affirmed: to reverse, a court would
have to find the seated jury's decisionmaking process inconsis-
64. Id. at 766.
65. Id. at 768.
66. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008).
67. See id. at 477.
68. Id. at 477-79 (holding that without a specific finding by the trial
judge, the record lacked evidence sufficient to prove the trial judge actually
made a determination regarding the excluded juror's behavior).
69. See id. at 484-86.
70. See id.
71. Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1454 (2009) (finding that denial is a
structural error requiring reversal only when it necessarily renders unreliable
a determination of guilt).
72. See id. at 1456.
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tent with a hypothetical rational jury.73 Appellate courts will
have difficulty making such speculative determinations.74
These cases form the foundation upon which state jury sel-
ection procedure rests. United States Supreme Court precedent
also provides the basis for any changes to the scope of peremp-
tory challenges. The next two sections detail Minnesota's jury
selection procedure as an example of state processes and dis-
cuss potential expansions to Batson protections in Minnesota
and other states.
B. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AS A CREATURE OF STATE
LAW: MINNESOTA PROCEDURE
In Minnesota, parties have a statutory entitlement to per-
emptory challenges.75 In criminal cases, the defendant receives
five and the State receives three challenges, unless the poten-
tial penalty is life imprisonment, in which case the defendant
gets fifteen and the State nine.76 In civil cases, each party rec-
eives two such challenges.77
The general procedure for selecting a jury begins with the
creation of a list of prospective jurors using voter registration
and driver's license lists.7 8 This list must represent a fair cross-
section of the community. 79 Minnesota prohibits excluding citi-
zens from the jury service list on the basis of "race, color, creed,
religion, sex, national origin, marital status, status with regard
to public assistance, disability, age, occupation, physical or sen-
sory disability, or economic status."80 Felony criminal trials use
twelve-person juries, while misdemeanor criminal and civil tri-
als use six-person juries.81 The court engages in voir dire ex-
73. The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV.
153, 218 (2009).
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 546.10 (2008); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 6.
76. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 6.
77. MINN. STAT. § 546.10.
78. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 2(1); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 806.
79. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 1.
80. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 809; see also MINN. STAT. § 593.32 subdiv. 1(2008). Other jurisdictions have similar restrictions. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 231.5 (West 2006). See generally AM. BAR ASs'N, PRINCIPLES FOR JU-
RIES AND JURY TRIALs 67-68, 80-82 (2005) (discussing jurisprudential roots of
the prohibition on discrimination against prospective jurors).
81. MINN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 4, 6.
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amination to narrow the jury service list to the appropriate size
jury.82
Voir dire examination proceeds by calling from the list a
panel of jurors equal to the number of jurors that will be
seated, plus the number of peremptory challenges each side
receives. 83 Prospective jurors answer questions first from the
judge, then from the defendant, and finally from the State.84 At
any time, the parties can challenge a prospective juror for
cause according to a list of specified reasons, including a prin-
ciple-agent relationship with one of the parties, prior jury ser-
vice on a similar case, or the "existence of a state of mind on the
part of the juror, in reference to the case or to either party,
which satisfies the court that the juror cannot try the case im-
partially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging." 85 The judge must rule on challenges for
cause, 86 and if she agrees to allow the strike for cause, a new
juror from the panel replaces the excluded juror.87 After each
party makes its challenges for cause, parties alternately exer-
cise peremptory challenges, starting with the defendant, until
the proper number of jurors remains.88 Thus, the process re-
quires each party to use all of their peremptory challenges.
Minnesota's procedure provides a nice example of a com-
mon state method for selecting juries. 89 While state processes
vary widely, all states give attorneys the chance to craft a jury
to their liking, and trial judges receive great discretion with re-
82. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 4.
83. Id. In some criminal cases, this step may be preceded by a jury ques-
tionnaire. Id. subdiv. 2(3).
84. Id. subdiv. 4(3)(a).
85. Id. subdiv. 5(1); see also State v. Roan, 532 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn.
1995) (holding that the criteria listed in subdivision 5(1) were the factors for
which a juror could be excused for cause).
86. To overturn a judge's ruling on a challenge for cause, an appellant
must show not only that the potential juror belonged in one of the above cate-
gories, but also that actual prejudice resulted. State v. Stufflebean, 329
N.W.2d 314, 317 (Minn. 1983).
87. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 4(3)(a).
88. Id. In first degree murder cases, jury selection proceeds in a different
manner. Jurors are examined one at a time, first by the court and then by the
defendant, at which time the defendant may exercise a challenge. Id. subdiv.
4(3)(c). If the defendant chooses to keep the prospective juror, the state may
question the juror and then exercise a for-cause or peremptory challenge. Id.
This process continues until the jury is filled. Id. The court may also decide to
use this process for any other case. Id. subdiv. 4(3)(b).
89. This is also the method suggested by the ABA. See AM. BAR ASS'N, su-
pra note 80, at 78.
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spect to their rulings on challenges. 90 Clear rules are needed to
ensure uniform and nondiscriminatory jury selection processes.
C. STATE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE
To address some of the discrimination problems associated
with peremptory challenges,91 various groups in Minnesota
have proposed changes to the jury selection system. Several
other states are also considering changes to the peremptory
system.92 This section first reviews Minnesota's proposals and
case law as examples of current jury selection reform and then
details other states' efforts.
1. Expansion of Batson Protection to Other Categories
The Minnesota State Bar Association's Diversity Commit-
tee, with the support of several other organizations, proposed
an amendment to prohibit discrimination on the basis of mem-
bership in an expanded list of classes in the jury selection
process.93 The proposed amendment would combine the rule
prohibiting the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate ju-
rors on the basis of race or gender with Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1.02, which dictates proceedings should be
conducted "without the purpose or effect of discrimination based
upon race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital sta-
tus, status with regard to public assistance, disability, handicap
in communication, sexual orientation, or age."9 4 By preventing
the use of a peremptory challenge to remove potential jurors on
the basis of membership in any of these categories, the
90. See HANNAFORD-AGOR & WATERS, supra note 16, at 3.
91. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-95 (1986) (discussing
race-based discrimination).
92. For example, California set up a task force that has researched vari-
ous aspects of voir dire for the past fifteen years. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, FACT SHEET: JURY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 1-2, 4-5 (Mar. 2009),
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/factsheets/jurysys.pdf. Massa-
chusetts recently created a task force to examine the history of the use of per-
emptory challenges. Mass. Bar Ass'n, MBA Task Force of Prominent Judges and
Attorneys to Tackle Jury Selection Issues, LAws. E-JOURNAL, Sept. 10, 2009, http://
www.massbar.org/for-attorneys/publications/e-journal/2009/september/09-10.
93. Lore, supra note 17, at 1, 5. Supporting organizations include the
Minnesota State Bar Association's Human Rights, Legal Assistance to the Dis-
advantaged, and Life and the Law Committees; and the Minnesota Lavender
Bar. Id. at 5.
94. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 1.02.
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amendment would effectively expand the Court's holding in
Batson.95
The Minnesota Supreme Court has heard two cases in
which it considered and rejected expansions to the protections
afforded by Batson. First, State v. Everett declined to extend Bat-
son protection to prospective jurors eliminated because of their
age.96 Since the U.S. Supreme Court's equal protection jurispru-
dence does not afford age-based classifications heightened or
strict scrutiny, 97 the court found no support for Batson protec-
tion.98
In State v. Davis, the defendant challenged the exclusion of
a black juror on the basis of religion.99 As a race-neutral reason
for the peremptory strike, the prosecutor explained that the po-
tential juror was a Jehovah's Witness, which the prosecutor be-
lieved would make the juror hesitant to exercise authority over
others.100 The court denied protection to jurors excluded on the
basis of religion in part because such discrimination did not
permeate the system in the same manner as racial discrimina-
tion, and in part because religious affiliation is not a self-
evident characteristic like race and gender.' 0 ' The defendant
appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied
95. Some also advocate for a quota system that would increase the repre-
sentativeness of the jury. Hennepin County, Minnesota has a groundbreaking
quota system for impaneling grand juries. It requires that the jury contain a
number of minorities equivalent to the percentage of minorities in the coun-
ty-about nine percent in 1992. HENNEPIN COUNTY ATTY'S TASK FORCE ON
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 45 (1992). Hence, if
the first twenty-one of twenty-three jurors have been selected and none has
self-identified as a minority, the next two jurors selected must be the next two
minorities on the list. Id. Some scholars have predicted that a similar plan for
petit juries would be constitutional. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quo-
tas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 710 (1995). Given the most recent U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence on affirmative action, however, it now appears
more likely that the Court would find such a plan unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729-
31 (2007) (holding that racial balancing was not, in itself, a compelling state
interest); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause would not permit the use of a quota system to give preference
to minorities on the basis of race).
96. State v. Everett, 472 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Minn. 1991).
97. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
98. See Everett, 472 N.W.2d at 869.
99. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1115 (1994).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 771.
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certiorari. 102 In a dissent from the denial of certiorari, however,
Justices Thomas and Scalia concluded that J.E.B. suggested
that Batson could be extended beyond race and that any classi-
fication afforded heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause should receive Batson protection.103
Other states have also considered, with no consensus, ex-
panding protection to jurors eliminated on the basis of religious
affiliation.104 One federal district court and a few state courts
have held that Batson's protections should expand to include
peremptory strikes based on religious affiliation.105 Some state
courts have extended Batson's protection to religious affiliation
on state constitutional grounds;106 others have drawn a distinc-
tion between religious affiliation and religious beliefs, allowing
a peremptory strike on the basis of the latter but not the for-
mer.107 And some states have declined to extend Batson to reli-
gious affiliation at all. 108
102. Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1994).
103. Id. at 1117 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Religion is one such classification.
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
104. See Robert W. Gurry, The Jury Is Out: The Urgent Need for a New Ap-
proach in Deciding When Religion-Based Peremptory Strikes Violate the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 91, 104-05 (2005).
105. See United States v. Somerstein, 959 F. Supp. 592, 594-95 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (relying in part on Justice Thomas's dissent from the denial of certiorari
in Davis v. Minnesota); State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)("We agree [that Batson should be] extended to encompass peremptory strikes
based upon religious membership or affiliation."); Bader v. State, 40 S.W.3d
738, 742 (Ark. 2001) (holding that a trial court could prohibit voir dire ques-
tions about venirepersons' religious affiliation and practices in part because of
the constitutional prohibition on religious discrimination found in the United
States Constitution: "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States" (citing U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 3)).
106. See Thorson v. State, 721 So. 2d 590, 594-95 (Miss. 1998) (holding
that state constitutional and statutory provisions prohibit peremptory chal-
lenges based solely on a person's religion); State v. Fuller, 812 A.2d 389, 396-
97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (noting that exclusion of jurors based on
religious affiliation would violate state constitutional and statutory provi-
sions), rev'd on other grounds, 862 A.2d 1130 (N.J. 2004).
107. See United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998);
State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553 (Conn. 1999); State v. Eason, 445 S.E.2d
917, 921 (N.C. 1994).
108. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994); Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 495-96 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (holding that Batson only applied to race-based
peremptories).
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Similarly, other courts have considered expanding Batson
to include strikes based on sexual orientation.109 At least one
state legislature has decided that sexual orientation should be
a cognizable class eligible for protection,110 but no court has ex-
panded Batson's protections to include homosexuality.111 The
Eighth Circuit has expressed doubt that Batson extends protec-
tion to venirepersons on the basis of sexual orientation, but has
never directly considered the issue.112
The American Bar Association's (ABA) American Jury
Project has also set out several proposals relating to juries, in-
cluding the use of peremptory challenges. 113 It recommends
that peremptory challenges not be allowed for "constitutionally
impermissible reasons," without elaborating on what such rea-
sons may be.114 Similar to Rule 1.02 of the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the ABA requires that eligibility for jury
service not be denied or limited on the basis of "race, national
origin, gender, age, religious belief, income, occupation, disabil-
ity, sexual orientation, or any other factor that discriminates
against a cognizable group." 115 Although the ABA believes jury
panel construction should not consider these characteristics, it
has made no effort to extend this rule to peremptory strikes.116
109. See, e.g., United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758, 769 (8th Cir. 2005)
(observing that the Ninth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, that sexual
orientation qualifies as a protected characteristic, but "doubt[ing] the validity
of this conclusion"); People v. Bell, 151 P.3d 292, 304 (Cal. 2007) ("Like the tri-
al court, we assume lesbians are a cognizable group for Wheeler-Batson pur-
poses.").
110. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231.5 (West 2006) ("A party may not use a
peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of an assump-
tion that the prospective juror is biased merely because of his or her race, col-
or, religion, sex, national origin, sexual orientation, or similar grounds.").
111. See, e.g., Johnson v. Campbell, 92 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Even
when we assume, without deciding, that sexual orientation qualifies as a Bat-
son classification, [plaintiff]'s appeal fails."); Bell, 151 P.3d at 304 (finding no
prima facie case of discrimination).
112. See Blaylock, 421 F.3d at 769; United States v. Ehrmann, 421 F.3d
774, 782 (8th Cir. 2005).
113. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 80, at 66-69.
114. Id. at 67.
115. Id. at 7.
116. See id. at 66-68 (discussing guidelines for using peremptory chal-
lenges without mentioning unconstitutionally discriminatory classes, and stat-
ing "[iut should be presumed that each party is utilizing peremptory challenges
validly").
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2. The Number of Challenges
Some Minnesota lawyers have also proposed changing the
number of peremptory challenges available for each side or
doing away with the challenge altogether.117 The ABA suggests
each side should have a uniform number of challenges.118 His-
torically, criminal defendants received a greater number of per-
emptory challenges than the State because the defendant's in-
terest in a trial free from bias outweighed the State's interest
in procuring a conviction.119 Minnesota still adheres to this
principle.120 Nine other states continue to allow the defendant
more challenges than the State.121 The Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure give each party twenty challenges in capital cas-
es, while in other felony cases the defendant has ten challenges
and the government receives six. 122 Minnesota's rules thus give
protection for defendants similar to other state and federal
rules in most cases.12 3
3. Elimination of the Peremptory Challenge
At the most extreme end, some commentators have called
for the elimination of peremptory challenge entirely.124 Various
117. Lore, supra note 17, at 5.
118. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 80, at 14. California's task force has also
recommended equalization of the number of challenges. J. CLARK KELSO ET
AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON JURY SYSTEM IM-
PROVEMENT 7 (1996).
119. See BUREAU OF INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OUTLINE
OF THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 105-07, 112 (2004) (discussing a defendant's in-
terest in an impartial jury, the customary additional peremptories afforded to
the defense, and the heavy burden the state bears to overcome the presump-
tion of innocence); cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (noting that
traditionally, the prosecutor's use of peremptories differed from that of the de-
fense).
120. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 6.
121. DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, at
228-31 tbl.41 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04
.pdf (comparing state allocation of peremptory challenges for trial juries).
122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
123. See generally MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26 (discussing Minnesota trial proce-
dure rules).
124. See, e.g., State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 347 (Minn. 1998) (Page, J.,
dissenting) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall,
J., concurring)) (favoring elimination of peremptory challenges); John Paul
Stevens, Foreword, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 907, 907-08 (2003) ("A citizen
should not be denied the opportunity to serve as a juror unless an impartial
judge can state an acceptable reason for the denial. A challenge for cause pro-
vides such a reason; a peremptory challenge does not."); see also Nancy S.
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Batson challenges in Minnesota have led one Minnesota Su-
preme Court Justice to question the continuing utility of per-
emptory challenges in the jury selection process. 125 Minnesota's
Supreme Court considered the first prong of the Batson test in
State v. Buggs, where it held that exclusion of a white juror
who had an interracial family violated neither the defendant's
nor the juror's equal protection rights. 126 In a dissent, Justice
Page noted that race remained at issue in Buggs and suggested
the proper inquiry would ask whether race played an imper-
missible role in the exclusion decision.127 Such an inquiry
would lead to the conclusion that the State did exclude the po-
tential juror on impermissible grounds since the juror's familial
association with minorities could have formed the basis for her
exclusion. 128 Further, the holding in State v. McRae made clear
that the State could not strike a black person who expressed
the same type of skepticism about the fairness of the system
with respect to minorities. 129 Buggs therefore conflicted with
this aspect of McRae's holding.
Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1683, 1713 (2006) ("The chorus of judges calling for the elimination of
the peremptory, while still small, is nonetheless growing.").
125. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 347 (Page, J., dissenting) (citing Batson, 476
U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring)) ("At a minimum, we should refer the
issue of the continued use of the peremptory challenge to the Criminal Rules
Committee for review, debate, and recommendation.").
126. See id. at 339 (majority opinion) ("The trial court correctly determined
that the defendant did not make a prima facie case that the challenge was ex-
ercised on the basis of race."). Although no U.S. Supreme Court precedent ad-
dresses this issue, some lower courts have extended Batson to the exclusion of
white jurors. See, e.g., Gov't of the V.I. v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1989)
(noting that, although the usual case of discrimination in peremptory chal-
lenges "involves the excusing of black jurors," the court would not distinguish
between "white and black"); State v. Knox, 609 So. 2d 803, 806 (La. 1992)
(holding that the state may object to a black defendant's racially discriminato-
ry peremptory challenge).
127. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 345 (Page, J., dissenting) (noting that the
inquiry is "whether race played an impermissible role" in the exclusion of the
juror).
128. See id. ('Thus, although juror 32 is caucasian, her association with
people of color may form the basis for the conclusion that her exclusion was
impermissibly race based and is, at a minimum, sufficient to make out a pri-
ma facie case under Batson.").
129. State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1992) (explaining that an
attorney may not strike any "fair-minded, reasonable black person from the
jury panel who expressed any doubt the 'the system' is perfect"); see also
Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 346 (Page, J., dissenting) (citing McRae, 494 N.W.2d at
257).
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Justice Page expressed further concern over the applica-
tion of the Batson process in cases involving white parties in
his sharp dissent in State v. Reiners.130 Reiners represented the
first case in which the court reversed the strike of a juror under
the deferential standard given to trial court findings, and was
also coincidentally the first case with a white defendant.131 This
result suggested to Justice Page a pattern of discrimination in
the court system.132 Ultimately, he concluded that the Rules
Committee should reconsider continued use of the peremptory
challenge. 133 The viability of these proposals must be evaluated
against the backdrop of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence,
state court rulings, and statutes. A careful examination shows
a decline in support for continued use of peremptory challenges.
II. THE CONTINUED USE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES IN JURY SELECTION IS LOSING VALIDITY
The foremost concern with use of the peremptory challenge
lies in the enormous potential for abuse.134 Since the challenge
historically allowed removal of a juror for any or no reason, it
often meant the challenging attorney could express his preju-
dices against members of distinct groups. 135 Such prejudicial
conduct had the invidious effect of infringing on the right of the
defendant to a procedurally fair trial and the right of the poten-
130. 664 N.W.2d 826, 835-41 (Minn. 2003) (Page, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 841 (noting the irony that "[iln each case except this one, we
deferred to the trial court").
132. See id. at 838 (finding "an extremely troublesome trend emerging" in
the decisions that "evinces a hostility toward jurors of color").
133. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 347 (Page, J., dissenting). Justice Page is
not the only jurist to advocate for elimination of the peremptory challenge.
See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) ("The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that perempto-
ries inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only
by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.").
134. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 269 (2005) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) ("[T]he use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selection
process seems better organized and more systematized than ever before.");
Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (pointing out that "[a]ny
prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and
trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons," and that uncon-
scious racism could lead to the biased construction of a jury).
135. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) ("[The peremptory
permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated
or demonstrable."); BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 189 (8th ed. 2004) ("At one time,
a peremptory challenge could not be attacked and did not have to be ex-
plained.").
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tial juror not to suffer discrimination in a state institution.136
Furthermore, imputing prejudicial decisionmaking to entire
groups of people based on a common factor furthered stereo-
types and misunderstandings.137
Commentators suggest three distinct but related proposals
to prevent such abuse. The first would limit use of the peremp-
tory challenge by expanding the number of groups that receive
Batson protection. The second would equalize the number of
challenges each side receives, and the third would eliminate
use of the preemptory challenge altogether. This Part discusses
the prospects of success for each of these solutions.
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT SUPPORTS EXPANSION OF
BATSON PROTECTION TO OTHER CATEGORIES
The most common argument against expansion of Batson
protection to other categories focuses on the difficulty of admin-
istration. 138 In practice, if the characteristic is not visible like
race and gender, the party bringing the Batson challenge would
have a difficult time proving purposeful discrimination because
he or she would have to show the opposing attorney actually
knew of the juror's protected characteristic.139 Critics have sug-
gested that to ensure impermissible discrimination has not oc-
curred, jurors would have to disclose their status with regard to
the protected classifications.14 0 Such disclosure may increase
the potential for discrimination, since the characteristic would
then become known and salient.141 In the current system, how-
ever, inquiry into such topics is considered inappropriate and is
136. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 ("The harm from discriminatory jury selec-
tion extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
touch the entire community.").
137. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1935) (disapproving of the
presumption that judicial officers disqualified African Americans for lack of
intelligence and other characteristics).
138. See, e.g., Johnson v. Campbell, 92 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (ex-
plaining that the characteristics that led the attorney to believe the potentialjuror was gay-such as mannerisms, marital status, and occupation-are dif-
ficult to accurately observe and even more difficult to prove).
139. Cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 (requiring a showing of purposeful discrimi-
nation by the opposing attorney).
140. See Lore, supra note 17, at 1 (considering whether jurors would have
to disclose sexual orientation to the court in order to determine whether any
discrimination took place).
141. See id. (noting that identification of protected categories may lead to
the exclusion of jurors based on those factors).
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unlikely to occur.142 Hence, the fear of forced disclosure of pro-
tected characteristics probably lacks foundation. In the absence
of inquiries into protected class status, reviewing courts give
trial judges such great deference in Batson decisions that with-
out evidence of membership in a protected class on the record,
challengers would likely lose on appeal.143
Opponents also argue that the proposed amendment would
effectively eliminate the peremptory challenge, because if at-
torneys have to justify the reason for using a peremptory
strike, then it is no longer truly peremptory.144 However, the
same argument would apply to Batson challenges on the basis
of race and gender, for which the Supreme Court has decided
the prevention of discrimination outweighs the attorney's in-
terest in the availability of unexplained peremptory strikes.145
In addition, by prohibiting peremptory challenges on the
basis of gender in J.E.B., the Court suggested that other cate-
gories that receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause should also receive protection under Batson.146
Such categories may include religion, 147 alienage,148 and poten-
tially homosexuality.14 9 Justice Thomas reinforced this view in
his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Davis v. Minnesota:
"[G]iven the Court's rationale in J.E.B., no principled reason
142. Cf. id. (explaining that, in practice, there is no discrimination based
upon these "other" factors).
143. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ("In the context of
direct review, therefore, we have noted that 'the trial court's decision on the
ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the
sort accorded great deference on appeal' and will not be overturned unless
clearly erroneous." (citation omitted)); see also E-mail from Roy Spurbeck, As-
sistant Pub. Defender, Appellate Div., State of Minn. Bd. of Pub. Def., to au-
thor (Apr. 21, 2009, 09:19 CST) (on file with author) (noting that trial judges
receive great deference on review).
144. See Lore, supra note 17, at 1.
145. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986) (discussing the use
of peremptory challenges as subject to the requirements of equal protection).
146. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (stating that parties
may use peremptory challenges to remove jurors belonging to categories that
receive rational basis review, which suggests peremptories may not be used to
remove jurors who belong to categories that receive heightened scrutiny).
147. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (holding that religious
affiliation is a suspect class and applying strict scrutiny to religion-based clas-
sifications).
148. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 219, 220 (1984) (subjecting discrimina-
tion based on alienage to strict scrutiny).
149. See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, If Obscenity Were to Discriminate, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 475, 485 (2009) (discussing constitutional protections afforded
to classifications based on sexual orientation).
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immediately appears for declining to apply Batson to any strike
based on a classification that is accorded heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.... because such strikes
'are not substantially related to an important government ob-
jective."'150 Thus, he felt other categories receiving special pro-
tection under the Equal Protection Clause should receive Bat-
son protection. 151
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court Rules Com-
mittee noted in the comments to the rule governing the exercise
of peremptory challenges that "counsel and the court should be
aware of the possibility that the Batson protections and proce-
dures could be extended by caselaw to other protected classes,
especially where that class is subject to heightened or strict
scrutiny, such as for religion."152 Thus, the Rules Committee
has acknowledged the possibility of expansion of Batson protec-
tions. Any practical concerns are likely overstated and should
not outweigh the constitutional ones anyway. In sum, Minneso-
ta's proposed amendment appears theoretically well-grounded
in precedent. Minnesota and other states should continue to
explore reforming their court rules to disallow discrimination in
the jury selection process.
B. EQUALIZATION OF THE NUMBER OF CHALLENGES DOES NOT
PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION
The ABA suggests each side receive a uniform number of
peremptory challenges.153 That suggestion derives support from
the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition that both the defendant
and the State have the historical right to use peremptory chal-
lenges. 154 However, opponents argue the defendant deserves
more challenges than the State because the defendant "has
more at stake individually than the State does in the outcome
of the trial."155
150. Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1994), denying cert. to 504
N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting J.E.B., 511 U.S. at
137 n.6).
151. See id.
152. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 6a cmt. (citing Davis, 504 N.W.2d
767, cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115).
153. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 80, at 66.
154. Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965) (noting the histori-
cal use of peremptories, and arguing that the persistence of their use suggests
that the challenge is widely accepted as a necessary part of trial by jury).
155. See E-mail from Roy Spurbeck, supra note 143.
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In the end, changing the number of peremptory challenges
each side receives may not have much effect on the outcome of
the case because peremptory challenges do not remove jurors
with demonstrated biases likely to affect the case. 15 6 Rather,
equalization would just change the size of the jury panel during
voir dire. 157 Additionally, each side would still have unlimited
challenges for cause, so attorneys could still eliminate demon-
strably biased or conflicted jurors.15 8 Hence, equalizing the
number of peremptory challenges each side receives would not
effectively address the problem of discriminatory use of the per-
emptory strike.
C. ELIMINATION OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES WOULD
PROMOTE BATSON'S AIMS
The peremptory challenge, although not constitutionally
required, remains one of the most venerated institutions of the
jury trial.159 Proponents argue that the challenge enhances the
perceived legitimacy of the system by allowing defendants to
help construct the tribunal that will judge them. 60 Since pros-
pective jurors rarely believe or admit that they will allow pre-
judice to affect their judgment, the parties must have a tool to
remove latent bias from the jury pool.161 Indeed, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has historically justified the peremptory challenge
with the explanation that it helps both parties obtain a fair and
156. See Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory
Study of Its Content and Effect, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 498 (1994) (find-
ing that jury composition varied only slightly between a carefully selected jury
and a randomly selected jury); Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The
Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Fed-
eral District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 507 (1978) (finding no appreciable
effect from the use of peremptory challenges on the outcomes in a majority of
cases).
157. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 4(3) (discussing the drawing,
examining, and challenging of jurors).
158. Cf. id. ("A challenge for cause may be made at any time during voir
dire by any party. At the close, . . . any additional challenges for cause shall be
made, first by the defense and then by the prosecution.").
159. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-20.
160. See John H. Mansfield, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Based Upon
or Affecting Religion, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 435, 447-51 (2004) (discussing
the use of peremptories and how their use could make verdicts more publicly
acceptable).
161. See Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Frame-
work for Court Policies and Procedures, 85 JUDICATURE 18, 23-25 (2001) (dis-
cussing the nature of information revealed during jury selection and the vari-
ous techniques used during the process to encourage "greater candor by
prospective jurors concerning sensitive or private matters").
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impartial jury. 162 Any outright elimination of the peremptory
would be a major departure from current practice in this coun-
try.163
With regard to the use of challenges, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court has commented that "[p]eremptory challenges are
designed to be used to excuse prospective jurors who can be fair
but are otherwise unsatisfactory to the challenging party. A
prospective juror who could not be fair would be subject to re-
moval for cause."164 This statement begs the question why a
prospective juror who could be fair would be unsatisfactory to
the challenging party, except for a discriminatory reason. The
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that trial courts must consider
the right of both the defendant and the excluded juror to a judi-
cial process free from discrimination. 165 If a challenging party
could only find a prospective juror unsatisfactory for a discrim-
inatory reason, and the defendant and the juror have a right to
a process free from discrimination, it logically follows that the
judicial process should not allow peremptory challenges. 166
162. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119-20 (1986) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (noting various rationales for the traditional use of perempto-
ries); cf. KELSO ET AL., supra note 118, at 57 (acknowledging that many scho-
lars have called for the elimination of the peremptory challenge, but ultimate-
ly deciding that peremptories help create fair and impartial juries); Shari
Seidman Diamond et al., Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v.
Kentucky, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 79 (1997) (noting that peremptory
challenges in the juror selection process "have been a part of the justice sys-
tem in the United States since 1790").
163. It is interesting to note that Great Britain, from which the United
States inherited its jury selection system, has eliminated its use of the per-
emptory challenge. See STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: DISORDER IN THE
COURT 223 (1994) (explaining that, though peremptories were once popular in
British legal culture, Parliament "did the deed" and eliminated peremptories
altogether in 1988). Some commentators believe this may be due to the greater
homogeneity of the population in England. See Alschuler, supra note 28, at
166.
164. State v. Reiners, 664 N.W.2d 826, 833 (Minn. 2003).
165. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
166. This viewpoint enjoys support by several notable jurists and academ-
ics. See, e.g., id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (advocating for the elimi-
nation of peremptory challenges); State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 347 (Minn.
1998) (Page, J., dissenting) ("Sitting here some 12 years after Batson, it cannot
be said that its promise to eradicate racial bias from the jury selection process
has been accomplished."); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should
Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 809, 871 (1997)
("[Elven assuming the peremptory challenge ever worked in this country as
anything other than a tool for racial purity, and even assuming it is working
today in its post-Batson configuration to eliminate hidden juror biases without
being either unconstitutionally discriminating or unconstitutionally irrational,
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Indeed, it remains unclear why the system would allow an
attorney to exclude a juror after a mere brief questioning based
on the belief that that juror would serve with bias, even though
the attorney cannot articulate any justifiable reason. The prac-
tice is particularly disturbing given the historical use of the
peremptory challenge as a pretext for discrimination.16 7 Such a
system effectively sanctions the exact same exercise of preju-
dice by the attorney that the peremptory strike attempts to
eliminate from the jury.168 Allowing the attorney's discrimina-
tory acts is unprincipled in a justice system anchored in proce-
dural fairness. 69 Discriminatory dismissal from jury service
will likely taint the perspective juror's view of the justice sys-
tem.170 Once the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged it valued a
justice system free from discrimination over attorneys' tradi-
tional use of the peremptory challenge,171 it took the first step
down the path towards elimination of the challenge. The U.S.
and state supreme courts should continue down that path.
III. STATES SHOULD ELIMINATE REGULAR USE OF THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The jury impaneling method in Minnesota and many other
states conflicts with the tripartite aims of Batson: vindicating
the rights of the defendant and the jurors and fostering public
confidence in the fairness of the system.172 As such, these im-
paneling methods need reform. By replacing each juror success-
fully removed for cause with a new venireperson, as in the cur-
I submit that its institutional costs outweigh any of its most highly-touted
benefits.").
167. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 597-99 (1935) (discussing the
historically discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge to exclude African
Americans from juries); Hoffman, supra note 166, at 829 ("[T]he peremptory
challenge was an incredibly efficient final racial filter.").
168. See Hoffman, supra note 166, at 830 ("[T]he preemptory challenge
once was, and now may again be, a tool to prevent impartial juries rather than
to ensure them.").
169. Cf. id. at 853-70 (arguing that use of the peremptory challenge is in-
consistent with the basic concepts associated with an impartial jury).
170. See KELSO ET AL., supra note 118, at 55-56 (citing exit interviews with
jurors in Los Angeles that found ninety-five percent of jurors dismissed by a
peremptory challenge had a negative view of the jury system, while those who
served on the jury had a positive view).
171. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99 (recognizing the traditional importance
of the peremptory challenge to trial procedures, but nonetheless holding that
equal protection concerns outweighed that importance).
172. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 830-44 (discussing Batson and the
developments leading up to, and following, the holdings of the case).
2099
MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW
rent impaneling method, the size of the panel does not diminish
with for-cause challenges. 173 Attorneys must use all of their
peremptory challenges to reduce the panel to the appropriate
size.174 Peremptory challenges provide ample opportunity for
discriminatory conduct by the attorneys. 75 Consequently,
forced use of peremptories leads to a greater risk of infringe-
ment of the prospective juror's rights and diminished public
confidence in the fairness of the system, without offering any
more protection to the defendant. The judicial system would
achieve greater fairness by eliminating the requirement that
parties use all of their peremptory challenges.
To this end, states should adopt a method for impaneling
juries whereby the panel is composed of a number of venireper-
sons equal to the number of jurors that will ultimately sit on
the jury, plus the statistically projected number of jurors elimi-
nated for cause. During questioning of the panel, attorneys
should make challenges for cause. If, after the court removes
jurors for cause, not enough jurors remain to form an entire
jury, the next people on the list should be added to the panel. If
too many venirepersons remain after challenges for cause, jurors
would be called and seated in the order in which they appear on
the list.176 Parties would only be allowed to use peremptory
challenges in rare cases where the trial judge decides peremp-
tory challenges advance the interests of justice. 177
173. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 4.
174. See id. Another oddity of Minnesota's system lies in the allocation of
peremptories for trials of crimes of different severities. Id. subdiv. 6. Although
misdemeanor trials only use six jurors, the defendant and state still receive
five and three peremptory challenges, respectively. See id. (for offenses not
punishable with life imprisonment, "the defendant shall be entitled to 5 and
the state to 3 peremptory challenges" regarding juror selection). This means
more jurors are eliminated through peremptory strikes than are left sitting on
the jury. Most states generally do, however, offer fewer peremptory challenges
for less severe crimes. See ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 121, at 228-31
tbl. 41.
175. See Broderick, supra note 11, at 420.
176. This would be similar to the current procedure, only eliminating the
exercise of peremptories. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 4 ("[T]he jury
shall be selected from the remaining prospective jurors in the order in which
they were called until the number selected equals the number of which the
jury shall be composed for the trial of the case. . . .").
177. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231(c) (West 2006) (allowing addi-
tional peremptories in civil cases when "the interests of justice ... require").
This is the standard often used to grant additional peremptory challenges. Cf.
id. Such situations may include cases tried in a location where bias might be a
particular problem, or cases that have received more publicity than average,
leading to a reasonable fear of juror bias.
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Opponents of this system might claim that it would in-
crease the number of for-cause challenges judges must rule on,
thus increasing the length and cost of voir dire. 178 However,
this system would also largely eliminate the need for judges to
rule on Batson challenges and the resulting appellate litigation,
potentially producing an overall cost savings.
In addition, some may object that the proposed system
would result in a judicially created jury.17 9 The proposed sys-
tem would effectively require judges to rule on every strike.
Nonetheless, the expansion of the Batson doctrine and the cor-
responding increase in objections to the use of peremptory chal-
lenges means judges already have to rule on many challenges.
Under the proposed reform, judges' rulings on Batson chal-
lenges would likely just become rulings on challenges for-
cause.180
Given the long history in the American judicial system and
the strength of attachment of attorneys on both sides to the
peremptory challenge, overcoming negative sentiment among
judicial actors might present the biggest hurdle to implementa-
tion of this proposed reform. However, the current rules in
many states allow for-cause challenges if the attorney identifies
in the potential juror a state of mind, with reference to the case
or either party, which indicates he would not be able to try the
case without prejudice to the rights of the challenging party.181
Thus, parties would still have an avenue through which to ex-
ercise their own judgment in the creation of their jury. This
proposed reform best vindicates the nondiscrimination ideal
embodied by the rule for creating jury service lists. 18 2 Although
178. See Marder, supra note 124, at 1715 ("Eliminating the peremptory
might require a slightly expanded for-cause challenge, but this should not be
reason for concern."). But see E-mail from Roy Spurbeck, supra note 143 (stat-
ing that jury selection in Minnesota tends to be nonconfrontational and quick).
179. See, e.g., Jon Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should It Be Conducted to En-
sure That Our Juries Are Representative and Impartial?, 3 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 65, 74-75 (1976) (stating a preference for attorney participation in voir
dire); cf. Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experi-
ments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 423, 432-33 (1985) (finding even minimal attorney participation en-
hances voir dire).
180. Cf. Marder, supra note 124, at 1716 (noting that peremptories may be
replaced by for-cause challenges, and thus for-cause challenges would have to
be expanded).
181. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 subdiv. 5(1)(1).
182. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 593.32 subdiv. 1 (2008) (discussing the general pro-
hibition on the exclusion of jurors for discriminatory purposes); MINN. GEN.
R. PRAC. 806 (governing jury source list creation).
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elimination of the peremptory strike may appear drastic,183 it is
the most effective way to protect the defendant's and juror's
rights to a judicial system free from discrimination, and foster
public confidence in the fairness of the system.
CONCLUSION
The peremptory challenge enjoys a long history in the
American judicial process. However, over the past four decades
the U.S. Supreme Court, beginning with its Batson opinion and
moving to the recent Rivera v. Illinois, has eroded the right to
use a peremptory strike, finding its benefit outweighed by the
harm caused by discriminatory use. This move reflects a grow-
ing interest among the American public in judicial systems free
from discrimination.
Groups in several states have proposed reforms designed to
further reduce discrimination in the judicial process. Minnesota
provides an apt case study for the viability of proposed reforms
because it is currently considering multiple options for reform.
Like Minnesota, states that use a jury impaneling system that
forces attorneys to use peremptory strikes particularly need
such reforms. The detrimental effects of forced exercise of the
peremptory challenge, and the lack of theoretical basis for its
continued use, suggest the best reform is eliminating peremp-
tory strikes in almost all cases. Elimination will best serve the
purposes of Batson and the antidiscrimination sentiment un-
derlying Batson's purposes. Furthermore, the for-cause chal-
lenge preserves the ability of parties to help construct the tri-
bunal that will judge them. Eliminating peremptory challenges
best balances the interests of contemporary society and should
receive serious consideration.
183. A less drastic proposal might involve adopting the jury impaneling
method used for first degree murders for all cases. Cf. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02
subdiv. 4(3)(c) (outlining the jury impaneling procedure for first degree mur-
der trials). This system has the advantage of not forcing attorneys to use per-
emptory challenges. Cf. id. (directing that the potential juror "may be chal-
lenged . . . peremptorily" but noting that the process of selection continues
until the number of persons needed to serve in the jury is selected from the
jury panel). However, it has the disadvantage of not allowing attorneys to con-
sider the entire panel before using a peremptory strike. Cf. id. ("The court
shall direct that one prospective juror at a time be drawn from the jury panel
for examination."). This could lead to strategic behavior such as saving one
strike for the end, which attorneys may find unfair. See generally AM. BAR
ASS'N, supra note 80, at 66-67 (discussing the use of peremptories and chal-
lenges for-cause).
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